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JURAL ENTITIES, REAL PARTIES IN
CONTROVERSY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
LITIGANTS: A UNIFIED APPROACH TO
THE DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
REQUIREMENTS FOR BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS
Charles A. Szypszak*
INTRODUCTION
The rules that make the federal courts available for the resolution
of controversies between citizens of different states have often been
described as placing an undue burden on the federal system.' Con-
gress has for the most part turned a deaf ear to calls by jurists and
commentators for reform or even abolition of federal diversity juris-
diction, leaving the courts to struggle with difficult issues about the
proper contours of the jurisdictional requirements.2
One recurring difficult issue is the manner in which citizenship is
to be attributed to the investors who compose various business orga-
nizations. The general rule has been that corporations are to be
treated as having an existence and citizenship separate from their
investors; only the entity has had to satisfy the diversity of citizen-
ship requirements.3 The rule is not so clear for other organizations,
however, even those that share many, or nearly all, of the corpora-
tion's fundamental characteristics. Consideration of policy argu-
ments against expansion of diversity jurisdiction has often been im-
plicit, and sometimes even explicit, in the determination of how
such unincorporated associations are to be treated.' Recently, a nar-
* Member, Orr and Reno, P.A., Concord, New Hampshire; Instructor, New Hamp-
shire Technical Institute. B.A., University of Southern California, 1979; MA.. San
Diego State University, 1982; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1982.
1. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y U. L. Rnv 97; RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURrS: CRISIS AND REFoRMt (1985); Felix Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 Coa-
NELL LQ. 499 (1928); George Cochran Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Cur-
tail Diversity Jurisdiction?, 44 A.BA J. 243 (1958). The debate has not been com-
pletely one-sided; persuasive cases have been made for the retention or extension of
diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction,
16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 403 (1979); William L. Marbury, Why Should We Limit Fed-
eral Diversity Jurisdiction?, 46 A-BA. J. 379 (1960).
2. Although there have been refinements in the diversity rules since their incep-
tion in 1789, there has not been any truly substantial retrenchment of diversity juris-
diction's availability. See infra note 13 (discussing the diversity statute's history).
3. See, e.g., Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990) ("the rule regard-
ing the treatment of corporations as 'citizens' has become firmly established").
4. See, e.g., id. at 197 (1990) (stating that expansion of entity treatment for busi-
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row majority of the United States Supreme Court sent a clear mes-
sage that the Court will not expand diversity jurisdiction for use by
an unincorporated association, even if the association seems to have
the same fundamental characteristics as a corporation.0
Evidently, concern about the burdens of diversity jurisdic-
tion-not sound doctrinal analysis-governs how citizenship will be
attributed to business organizations. The Supreme Court has cre-
ated a "doctrinal wall"6 around corporations that enables courts to
avoid persuasive arguments that other business organizations should
also be able to qualify for diversity jurisdiction as entities apart
from their investors.
Moreover, the rules are not as tidy as the declaration of a "doctri-
nal wall" would suggest. The Supreme Court has applied a "real
party in controversy" test7 to permit one type of organization-a
business trust-to qualify for diversity based on the trustees' citi-
zenship alone, thereby overcoming any lack of diversity due to com-
mon citizenship of the trust's beneficiary investors.' The rules gov-
erning business organizations' access to the federal courts are
further complicated by a procedural mechanism found in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.2,' which enables suits to be brought by
ness organizations is a matter for Congress, not the courts); Carlsberg Resources
Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1256-57 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating
that federalism concerns and the federal courts' heavy workload require that jurisdic-
tion not be permitted on the basis of diversity "unless there has been a definitive
determination that diversity of citizenship is present").
5. In Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 184 (1990), the Court insisted that all
investors in a modern limited partnership must satisfy the diversity requirement not-
withstanding fundamental similarities between limited partners and corporate share-
holders. Justice Scalia wrote that the Court's resolutions "can validly be character-
ized as technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy considerations raised
by the changing realities of business organization," but "[w]e have long since decided
that, having established special treatment for corporations, we will leave the rest to
Congress. ... Id. at 196-97.
6. The term "doctrinal wall" was first used in United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H.
Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965), to describe the rule stated in Chapman v.
Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889), in which the Court said that only business organiza-
tions that are in fact corporations are to be treated as such for diversity jurisdiction
purposes.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60 for a description of the "real party in
controversy" test.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 72-79.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2, Actions Relating to Unincorporated Associations, reads as
follows:
An action brought by or against the members of an unincorporated associa-
tion as a class by naming certain members as representative parties may be
maintained only if it appears that the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the association and its members. In the
conduct of the action the court may make appropriate orders corresponding
with those described in Rule 23(d), and the procedure for dismissal or com-
promise of the action shall correspond with that provided in Rule 23(e).
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or against an organization's designated representatives. Some courts
have interpreted Rule 23.2 as giving access to the federal courts
solely for the purpose of providing a convenient procedure for
designating representative litigants when state law does not provide
one.10 Other courts refuse to allow Rule 23.2 to be employed in this
role, on the ground that to do so is inconsistent with the judicial
policy of interpreting the availability of diversity jurisdiction nar-
rowly. 1 The very existence of Rule 23.2, as well as the real party in
controversy test, makes it possible for some business organizations
to gain access to the federal forum regardless of where they are
found in relation to the Supreme Court's entity status "doctrinal
wall." As a result, potential litigants may be unable to predict confi-
dently whether they can sustain a suit in federal court.
This Article discusses the evolution of the entity treatment, real
party in controversy, and Rule 23.2 representative litigant rules as
they are applied to business organizations, and argues for a predict-
able, theoretically sound approach that is based not on an apologeti-
cally offered arbitrary line, but rather on investor expectations
viewed in the context of diversity jurisdiction's underlying purposes.
Part I discusses the "doctrinal wall" erected by the Supreme Court
around corporations and the Court's refusal to extend similar entity
treatment to unincorporated associations. Part H discusses the real
party in controversy test and reveals its inappropriateness in the
business organization context. Part III considers whether there is,
after all, a sound analytical basis for distinguishing among the vari-
ous business organizations in establishing diversity requirements.
Part IV examines representative suits and the circuits' conflicting
interpretations of Rule 23.2, and urges alignment of the Rule with
the treatment given to corporations under the Supreme Court's en-
tity status analysis.
I. ENTITY TREATMENT FOR BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
"DOCTRINAL WALL" AROUND CORPORATIONS
The Judiciary Act of 1789 invoked the constitutional grant of fed-
eral judicial authority over "Citizens of different states"'" by em-
powering federal courts to hear a suit "between a citizen of the State
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State." 3 In com-
10. See infra text accompanying notes 186-97.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 175-82.
12. US. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
13. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789). The Act provided:
That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or
in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or
petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the
State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.
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mon usage the term "citizen" evokes notions of a singular natural
person, but redress in the courts is also sought by groups of individ-
uals who have organized in a common business enterprise. Congress
has never said directly how such organizations are to be treated for
diversity jurisdiction purposes. The Supreme Court has been left to
struggle with this often complex question.
A. Corporations
Business corporations became an important organizational form in
the United States by the beginning of the nineteenth century.
1 4
When first squarely confronted with the issue of a corporation's citi-
zenship for jurisdictional purposes, the Supreme Court, in Bank of
the United States v. Deveaux,15 said that all investors composing
the entity are "citizens" and must each satisfy the diversity require-
ments. Regarding the corporate entity, the Court said: "That invisi-
ble, intangible and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corpora-
tion aggregate, is certainly not a citizen .... "10
A few years after Deveaux was decided, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that its opinion had been unsatisfactory,1 7 and the Court re-
versed its position on a corporation's citizenship. In Louisville Rail-
road Co. v. Letson,8 the Court said that
a corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is
to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, although an
artificial person, an inhabitant of the same state, for the purposes
of its incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of that
state, as much as a natural person.19
The Court recited the famous passage in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward that "a corporation is an artificial being, invis-
ible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."20 To
skirt the analytical difficulties that stem from the reality that a
Id.
In 1875, the diversity provision was substantially altered to give circuit courts juris-
diction over cases exceeding $500 "in which there shall be a controversy between citi-
zens of different States or ... between citizens of a State and foreign states, citizens
or subjects . . . ." Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). The mini-
mum jurisdictional amount has been raised a number of times, and currently is
$50,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). For a thorough history of the diversity provision, see
generally 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.71 (1991) there-
inafter 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
14. 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 2 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990).
15. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
16. Id. at 86.
17. See Louisville R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844).
18. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
19. Id. at 558.
20. Id. (quoting Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 636 (1819)).
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"'corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of
the sovereignty by which it is created,' -2, the Court adopted a fic-
tion to treat shareholders collectively, so that those who act for the
corporation shall "be justly presumed to be resident in the State
which is the necessary habitat of the corporation .... "12 Thus, the
citizenship of the corporation is "conclusive as to the residence or
citizenship of those who use the corporate name and exercise the
faculties conferred by it .... -"3 The Court thereby made the cor-
porate entity the focus of the diversity jurisdiction analysis without
having to give the entity full citizenship status for other purposes.24
Congress has never explicitly sanctioned the Supreme Court's
treatment of a corporation as a jural entity whose citizenship is the
exclusive measure of diversity. Neither has it rejected the approach.
There has been acknowledgment in the diversity statute's legislative
history of a "now established doctrine that a corporation, for the
purposes of jurisdiction, is deemed a citizen of the State in which it
is incorporated. '25 In 1958, Congress implicitly affirmed treatment
of a corporation as a citizen when it directed how that citizenship
should be determined: "a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of
any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where
it has its principal place of business." 6 The purpose of this legisla-
tion, however, does not appear to have been to approve the citizen-
ship treatment being accorded to corporations, but rather to curtail
diversity jurisdiction as it applies to corporations by giving a corpo-
ration dual citizenship when its principal place of business is in a
different state than its state of incorporation." Consequently, the
21. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853)
(quoting Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517, 596 (1839)).
22. Id. at 328.
23. Id. at 329. According to one commentator, the Court was concerned about the
potential "objection that citizenship cannot reside in a being that lacks humanity
because it is a mere abstraction. . . " so it adopted a fiction that it was the citizen-
ship of the shareholders that counted, but their citizenship was conclusively pre-
sumed to be the corporation's residence. Frederick Green, Corporations as Persons,
Citizens, and Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. PA. L. Ray. 202, 220-21 (1946).
24. See 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrzCE, supra note 13, 0.76[5] at 800.74 n.3. Cor-
porations have been treated as constitutional "persons" for such purposes as protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures, G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
429 U.S. 338 (1977); protection against burdens on interstate commerce, Allenberg
Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); and First Amend-
ment commercial expressions, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
25. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958), reprinted in 1958 USC.CAN.
3099, 3101 (citation omitted).
26. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c) (1988)).
27. See 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAc'rcE, supra note 13, 1 0.77[1.-21. One commenta-
tor has said that the Supreme Court should not feel constrained by the 1958 amend-
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entity status accorded to corporations continues to rest on the Su-
preme Court's application of a legal fiction.
B. Unincorporated Associations
According to the Supreme Court, "[ihe tradition of the common
law is to treat as legal persons only incorporated groups and to as-
similate all others to partnerships. '2 With one noteworthy excep-
tion, which is discussed below, the Court has refused to treat any
business organization other than the corporation as a singular jural
entity for diversity jurisdiction purposes, regardless of the degree of
similarity between the association's structure and the corporate
form.
The Supreme Court's first real treatment of the issue as it applies
to an unincorporated association was in Chapman v. Barney,29 in
which the Court held that a joint stock company was not to be
treated as a legal personality.3 0 The Court said that "the express
company cannot be a citizen of New York, within the meaning of
the statutes regulating jurisdiction, unless it be a corporation."31
The Court drew a bright line; since the group was "not a corpora-
tion," it had to be "a mere partnership.
'32
The unique status ascribed to the corporate entity in Chapman v.
Barney withstood a challenge in Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel
Co. v. Jones,3 3 where an early incarnation of the limited partnership
form was held not to have citizenship status for diversity jurisdic-
tion purposes.3 4 In Fire Proof Hotel, a Pennsylvania "limited part-
nership association" sought to collect on a debt. The association had
many corporate characteristics; state law gave it entity status, and
the organization had a single class of partners with voting power
over management, all of whom had limited liability.3 5 The Supreme
ment in considering entity citizenship because the amendment was
plainly directed to the separate issue of eliminating abuses of the presump-
tion of shareholder citizenship; the amendment can easily be held to leave
unimpaired the Court's power to construe "citizen" according to statutory
purpose, or even to express concurrence with the Court's original view that
associations having the characteristics of citizens should be treated as such.
David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 35-36 (1968).
28. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480 (1933).
29. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
30. Id. at 682.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 177 U.S. 449, 454 (1900).
34. Id. at 450-51.
35. Id. at 456 (discussing Pennsylvania cases that address the nature of the lim-
ited partnership associations). See also Hill, Keiser & Co. v. Stetler, 127 Pa. 145, 161-
62 (1888) (discussing the characteristics of limited partnership association); Oak
Ridge Coal Co. v. Rogers, 108 Pa. 147, 150-51 (1884) (same); Robert J. Kopecky,
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Court refused, however, to compare this association with a corpora-
tion, noting that having "some of the characteristics" of a corpora-
tion was insufficient to warrant treating something other than a cor-
poration as if it were a corporation for diversity purposes.30
In 1933, the Supreme Court led some to believe that possibly
other business organizations should share the corporation's favored
status.3 7 In Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,"5 the Court held that a
sociedad en comandita, an unincorporated association organized
under Puerto Rico law, should enjoy the same citizenship treatment
as a corporation. 9 The sociedad's dispositive characteristics, accord-
ing to the Court, were its contractual powers, right to own property,
right to sue and be sued, continuity of existence apart from its mem-
bers, centralized management, and limited liability for some inves-
tors 0-- all characteristics generally shared by corporations."'
Russell suggested that courts should compare an unincorporated
entity's salient characteristics with those of a corporation, and if
these characteristics were functionally identical, then the unincorpo-
rated entity should be treated as a citizen in its own right for diver-
sity jurisdiction purposes. The Second Circuit adopted this ap-
proach in Mason v. American Express Co.,42 in which the court held
that an unincorporated joint stock association's essential character-
istics "sufficiently invest it with a legal personality apart from its
individual members, so that it is just and sensible to regard it as a
separate entity for purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
Comment, Limited Partnerships and Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 45 U. CHL L
REv. 384, 389 n.36 (1978) (same).
36. Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. at 455-56.
37. See Note, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-Citizenship for Unincorporated
Associations, 19 VAND. L. Rsv. 984, 985 (1966) (observing that some courts viewed the
Supreme Court's opinion in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933); see
infra text accompanying notes 38-41, as potential justification for a change to the rule
requiring separate citizenship consideration of each member in an unincorporated
association).
38. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
39. "The issue in Russell was not diversity, but whether the suit against the socie-
dad en comandita could be removed from the Insular District Court to the United
States District Court for Puerto Rico ... " Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185,
207 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 190 n.2 (the majority acknowl-
edging Justice O'Connor's characterization of Russell). The citizenship analysis em-
ployed in the removal analysis was identical to the diversity analysis, however. See
id.; Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. at 480-82.
40. One class of members was contingently liable for the entity's debts if the en-
tity's assets were insufficient to satisfy them. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S.
at 481. The Court said that "this liability is of no more consequence for present pur-
poses than that imposed on corporate shareholders by the statutes of some states."
Id. The modem corporate shareholder has no such contingent liability.
41. Id. at 480-82.
42. 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
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tion.' 4 3 The Second Circuit thought that with Russell
the Supreme Court . . . abandoned the artificial and mechanical
rule of Chapman v. Barney in favor of a more flexible test for ca-
pacity for citizenship, a test which demands that consideration be
given to whether an organization's essential characteristics suffi-
ciently invest it, like a corporation, with a complete legal personal-
ity distinct from that of the members it represents."'
The characteristics that persuaded the court to give entity treat-
ment to the joint stock association were its creation by the filing of
articles of association, the issuance of capital stock, an existence
that withstood individual investor departure, centralized manage-
ment, rights to own property and to sue and be sued, and some limi-
tations on liability.4 5
In the Supreme Court session immediately following the Mason
decision, the Court expressly rejected any tendency toward expan-
sion of entity treatment for the purposes of diversity citizenship. In
United Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc.,'0 the Court
refused to consider an unincorporated labor group as having its own
citizenship. Corporations, the Court said, were susceptible of a par-
ticular "certainty of application," but in attempting to fashion a cit-
izenship analysis for a labor union, the Court said it "would be faced
with difficulties which [it] could not adequately resolve.' 7 These
matters were "suited to the legislature and not the judicial
43. Id. at 400.
44. Id. at 393.
45. Id. at 399-400. Members did have individual liability, but the court was will-
ing to overlook this distinction from a corporation because the individual liability was
contingent on exhaustion of relief against the entity, and this was similar to the ex-
tent of individual liability imposed on corporate shareholders in some circumstances
at the time. Id. at 401. Mason has been criticized for the way it compared the joint
stock association to the Russell sociedad, rather than to a corporation, thereby
threatening a "chain reaction" in which associations could obtain entity status by
comparison to organizations that have achieved such status based in turn on their
similarity to corporations. See Stephen H. Hutzelman, Note, Federal Procedure: Di-
versity Jurisdiction: Unincorporated Associations: United Steelworkers of America
v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965), 51 CORNELL L.Q. 827, 830 (1966).
There are only a few other instances where courts have deemed certain organiza-
tions to merit entity treatment for diversity purposes. See Swan v. First Church of
Christ, Scientist, 225 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1955) (unincorporated religious society
deemed to be body corporate); Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d
Cir. 1947), reh'g granted, 169 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1948) (joint stock association given
entity treatment); Andrews Bros. Co. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 F. 585 (6th Cir.
1898) (equating a Pennsylvania limited partnership to a corporation); Liverpool, Bra-
zil & River Platte Navigation Co. v. Agar & Lelong, 14 F. 615 (C.C.E.D. La. 1882)
(Louisiana civil law partnership equated to a corporation); Luce & Co. v. Alimentos
Borinquenos, S.A., 276 F. Supp. 94 (D.P.R. 1967) (Puerto Rico civil law partnership
given entity status for diversity jurisdiction purposes).
46. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
47. Id. at 152.
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branch." 48
In 1990, in Carden v. Arkoma Associates,49 the Court once again
addressed the issue of entity status for an unincorporated business
organization. In Carden, the Court considered the status of the
modern limited partnership. The limited partnership sought not to
have the citizenship of its limited partners counted in the diversity
analysis. The Court acknowledged that "limited partnerships are
functionally similar to 'other types of organizations that have access
to federal courts,'" and perhaps "'[c]onsiderations of basic fairness
and substance over form require that limited partnerships receive
similar treatment.' "0 Yet the Court remained steadfast with its
"doctrinal wall of Chapman v. Barney"' and instructed that
[t]here could be no doubt, after Bouligny, that at least common-
law entities (and likely all entities beyond the Puerto Rican socie-
dad en comandita) would be treated for purposes of the diversity
statute pursuant to what Russell called "[t]he tradition of the com-
mon law," which is "to treat as legal persons only incorporated
groups and to assimilate all others to partnerships." 82
This "doctrinal wall" restatement leaves open the possibility that
there could be statutorily created organizations that qualify for en-
tity treatment. In rejecting expansion of entity treatment, the Court
referred specifically only to "common-law entities" and suggested
that the sociedad in all likelihood established the outermost bound-
ary for these kinds of organizations. Yet when the opinion is read as
a whole, the Court appears unwilling to extend entity treatment be-
yond corporations no matter what form the organization takes. The
Court acknowledged that its opinion "can validly be characterized as
technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy considera-
tions raised by the changing realities of business organization."83
But abstention from expansion of diversity jurisdiction was deemed
more important than perceived faithfulness to organizational reali-
ties. The Court's closing remarks appear to shut the door to further
consideration of the issue:
The 50 States have created, and will continue to create, a wide as-
sortment of artificial entities possessing different powers and char-
acteristics, and composed of various classes of members with vary-
ing degrees of interest and control. Which of them is entitled to be
considered a "citizen" for diversity purposes, and which of their
48. Id. at 153.
49. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
50. Id. at 196 (quoting Respondent's Brief at 33, Carden v. Arkoma Assocs. (No.
88-1476)).
51. Id. at 189 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382
U.S. 145, 151 (1965)).
52. Id. at 190 (quoting Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 88 U.S. 476, 480 (1933)).
53. Id. at 196.
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members' citizenship is to be consulted, are questions more readily
resolved by legislative prescription than by legal reasoning, and
questions whose complexity is particularly unwelcome at the
threshold stage of determining whether a court has jurisdiction. We
have long since decided that, having established special treatment
for corporations, we will leave the rest to Congress; we adhere to
that decision. 4
II. REAL PARTIES IN CONTROVERSY AND EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN
MEMBERS
In Carden, the Supreme Court described Chapman v. Barney as
having created a "doctrinal wall" around corporations that could
"not be breached. ' 55 Some circuits have understood this to mean
"that considerations of varying membership status should not bear
on the fundamental inquiry whether diversity exists."' 8 But contrary
to the doctrinal purity that such statements suggest, there have
been instances when courts, including the Supreme Court, have em-
barked on fact-specific examinations of the composition of business
organizations.
The modern limited partnership, which has two categories of in-
vestor-general and limited partners-is an organizational variation
whose structure suggests that it may be possible to avoid the "doc-
trinal wall" for entity treatment. This could be accomplished by ig-
noring the citizenship of certain potentially non-diverse members of
the organization on the ground that they are not the "real parties in
controversy." In Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,5 7 the Second
Circuit held that limited partners' citizenship was irrelevant to the
determination of diversity jurisdiction. According to the court, only
the general partners mattered for this purpose. The basis for this
conclusion was that under New York limited partnership law a lim-
ited partner was "not a proper party to proceedings by or against a
partnership, except where the object is to enforce a limited partner's
right against or liability to the partnership." '
The Colonial Realty analysis was a departure from the entity ap-
proach that had been employed by the Supreme Court since the
Court gave corporations entity status in Louisville Railroad Co. v.
Letson.59 The analysis focused on state law characteristics given to
54. Id. at 197.
55. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990) (citing United Steelwork-
ers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965)).
56. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1259
(3d Cir. 1977). See also, e.g., New York State Teachers Retirement Sys. v. Kalkus,
764 F.2d 1015, 1019 (4th Cir. 1985); Elston Investment Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing
Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1984).
57. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966).
58. Id. at 183 (quoting N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115 (McKinney 1988)).
59. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
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particular investors and asked who were the proper parties to the
proceeding, and, by extension, who needed to be considered for pur-
poses of determining whether there was complete diversity.00
The Fifth Circuit apparently saw the real party in controversy
test, as employed by the Second Circuit, as a means for avoiding the
analytical shortcomings of the Supreme Court's "doctrinal wall" ap-
proach to determining a business organization's citizenship. In Mesa
Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp.,"' the
Fifth Circuit suggested that courts who clung to the conception of a
doctrinal wall were motivated by a "disinclination to expand diver-
sity jurisdiction."8 " The Fifth Circuit found this concern "irrele-
vant,""3 and held that because the limited partnership's general
partners "alone as against the limited partners, control and manage
assets, [and] conduct all business and control all litigation," only the
general partners were the real parties in controversy."
The Fifth Circuit followed its Mesa Operating ruling in Arkoma
Associates v. Carden in 1988, again holding that limited partners'
citizenship was not relevant to the diversity analysis.6 0 On appeal,
four Supreme Court justices defended the logic of the real party in
controversy test and expressed approval of the Fifth Circuit's ap-
proach-that is, that the entity's status as a citizen was not the
proper focus. 6  The majority, however, rejected this leap over the
entity analysis as a "fallacy" and insisted that the Court first "must
decide . . . the quite different question of how the citizenship of
that single artificial entity is to be determined . . ... 6 The Court
reiterated that limited partnerships would not be accorded entity
status, 8 and then considered whether the limited partners' citizen-
ship could be disregarded, leaving only the general partners to sat-
60. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d at 183.84.
61. 797 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1986).
62. Id. at 241.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 242-43. The court distinguished Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones,
177 U.S. 449 (1900), in which the Supreme Court had refused to grant citizenship
status to a limited partnership association, by pointing to the fact that the limited
partnership association in that case had only one class of partners, while the modern
limited partnership has two. Mesa Operating Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas
Corp., 797 F.2d at 241. If the court applied the entity-comparison approach, this dis-
tinction would argue against entity treatment for modern limited partnerships be-
cause the limited partnership association, with a single investor class, is more closely
analogous to a corporation than is the two-class modem limited partnership. The real
party in controversy approach avoids this issue.
65. 874 F.2d 226, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1988), revd sub nom. Carden v. Arkoma As.
socs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
66. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. at 198-209 (O'Connor, J., dissenting,
joined by Brennan, J.; Marshall, J.; and Blackmun, J.).
67. Id. at 188 n.1.
68. Id. at 189 (citing Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456-57
(1900)).
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isfy the complete diversity requirement.6 9 The Court rejected any
test that would evaluate a limited partner's role in the organization
to determine whether that role is significant enough to warrant citi-
zenship attributes: "We have never held that an artificial entity, su-
ing or being sued in its own name, can invoke the diversity jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts based on the citizenship of some but not
all of its members. 7 0 The Court thus refused to assess the signifi-
cance of the limited partner's role in the enterprise on the ground
that it had never before engaged in this kind of analysis.71
While the Carden majority was certainly correct when it noted
that the Court has never held that an entity can invoke diversity
jurisdiction based on some of its members' citizenship, the Court
had held, in Navarro Savings Ass'n v. Lee,"7 that some of a business
organization's participants can invoke diversity jurisdiction on be-
half of the organization's investors. In Navarro, the Court held that
the trustees of a Massachusetts business trust were the real parties
in a controversy over an alleged breach by a lender to make a take-
out loan to a firm that had borrowed from the trust."3 Some of the
trust's beneficiaries were citizens of the same state as the lender.
74
The Court acknowledged that the business trust resembled business
organizations in which each member is taken into account in the
diversity analysis."5 The Court said, however, that the trust was
"neither an association nor a corporation," but rather was "an ex-
press trust. '7' The Court held that "[flor more than 150 years, the
law has permitted trustees who meet this standard to sue in their
own right, without regard to the citizenship of the trust benefi-
ciaries. We find no reason to forsake that principle today. '7 7
Navarro contains language suggesting that the Supreme Court did
not want the real party in controversy test to be applied to any busi-
ness organization other than one formed according to trust princi-
ples. The Supreme Court was careful to say that it
never has analogized express trusts to business entities for pur-
poses of diversity jurisdiction. Even when the Court espoused the
view that a corporation lacked citizenship, Mr. Chief Justice Mar-
shall explained that the doctrine had no bearing on the status of
trustees. "When [persons suing by a corporate name] are said to be
substantially the parties to the controversy, the court does not
mean to liken it to the case of a trustee. A trustee is a real person
69. Id. at 192.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
73. Id. at 459-60.
74. Id. at 460.
75. Id. at 461.
76. Id. at 462.
77. Id. at 465-66.
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capable of being a citizen .... who has the whole legal estate in
himself. At law, he is the real proprietor, and he represents himself,
and sues in his own right. ' 8
Thus, the Court's refusal to treat business trusts as business entities
can be attributed more to adherence to trust law principles than to
the realities of business organizations. Justice Blackmun, who dis-
sented in Navarro, said he was
troubled by the Court's intimation that business trusts are to be
treated differently from other functionally analogous business as-
sociations-partnerships, limited partnerships, joint stock compa-
nies, and the like. I fear that, at bottom, the Court's distinction
between business trusts and these other enterprises hinges on the
locus of title to the trust assets, a formalistic criterion having little
to do with a realistic assessment of the respective degrees of con-
trol over the trust's activities that may be exercised by sharehold-
ers and trustees.7 9
The Navarro majority's disclaimer of having conducted any func-
tional analysis, and the dissent's contention that the beneficiaries in
that case acted like partners, illustrate a serious deficiency of the
real party in controversy test: the manner in which it complicates
the jurisdictional issue.
This complication defeats the historical purpose of the real party
in controversy test, which is to simplify and prevent jurisdictional
disputes. At common law, holders of equitable or beneficial interests
could not sue; the holder of the legal interest was the "real party in
interest."' 0 Accordingly, someone who stood to benefit from the out-
come of litigation, but who did not have a legally protected right at
risk, was not a "real party."81 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
78. Id. at 463 n.10 (quoting Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
61, 91 (1809)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 475-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun
examined the business trust's organization and concluded that the beneficial share-
holders' citizenship should be counted because of the amount of control the share-
holders had over the trustees' actions. Id. at 476. This conclusion, if correct, and if
applied by analogy to the limited partnership, could result in a determination that
limited partners' citizenship should be taken into account for diversity purposes
under the real party in controversy analysis. Compare Justice Blackmun's analysis,
id., with Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. at 204-06 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the citizenship of limited partners should not be counted because
they are so similar to the beneficiaries of a business trust).
80. See 3A JAMEs W. MooRE Er AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcncE 1 17.08 (2d ed.
1991) (discussing the common law and equity background of the real party in interest
rule).
81. E.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452,
466 (5th Cir. 1984) (city with only an economic interest in natural gas supply dispute
is not a real party in interest), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984); Kidwell v. Meikle,
597 F.2d 1273, 1287 (9th Cir. 1979) (parties who neither bought nor sold securities
could not bring securities violation suit).
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address this issue in Rule 17(a), which states that "[e]very action
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."82 Ac-
cording to the advisory committee, the function of this Rule "is sim-
ply to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the
party actually entitled to recover, and to ensure generally that the
judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata. 8 3
The real party in controversy diversity requirement closely paral-
lels Rule 17(a), s ' although the two are not identical.8 5 Thus, for ex-
ample, executors and administrators," guardians,8 7 and bailees"
have been held to be the real parties in controversy for diversity
purposes. The Rule 17(a) real party in interest analysis is necessarily
independent of the diversity analysis, however, because the Federal
Rules cannot affect the court's jurisdiction or venue.89
The real party in controversy test does not simplify the jurisdic-
tional analysis as it is supposed to. Instead, the test greatly compli-
cates diversity questions. Determinations about who has the "real
and substantial" interest are necessarily specific to the particular
entity involved.90 When the entity is statutory and governed by uni-
form rules that have been adopted nationally, as with a business
trust, a single assessment of which classes of members are real par-
ties in controversy might be generally applicable to other similarly
structured organizations. But any material variations among the
states within the same general structure, and any structures not pre-
viously considered, especially in non-statutory organizations, will
A federal statute directly addresses attempts to become-or to avoid becoming-a
real party in interest by assignment of rights: "A district court shall not have jurisdic-
tion of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been im-
properly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." 28
U.S.C. § 1359 (1988).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
84. See Navarro Savings Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 462 n.9 (1980).
85. The Supreme Court has observed that "[i]n appropriate circumstances, for
example, a labor union may file suit in its own name as a real party in interest under
Rule 17(a). To establish diversity, however, the union must rely upon the citizenship
of each of its members." Id.
86. New Orleans v. Gaines's Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595, 606-07 (1891).
87. Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 434 (1903).
88. Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d 818, 823 (8th Cir.
1951).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 82. See 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1564 (1990).
90. See, e.g., Wilsey v. Eddingfield, 475 U.S. 1130 (1985), denying cert. to 780
F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1986), in which three members of the Supreme Court wanted the
opportunity to review the Seventh Circuit's holding that the statutory beneficiaries in
a wrongful death action were real parties in controversy. The Justices thought this
might conflict with Navarro, and observed that the Seventh Circuit's approach
"could make for a difficult and time-consuming determination in ascertaining diver-
sity for jurisdictional purposes." Id.
[Vol. 44:1
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
The case-specific nature of the real party in controversy approach
is the foundation of its apparent usefulness as a mechanism for tak-
ing into account certain commercial realities of business organiza-
tional structure, rather than relying solely on entity characteriza-
tion.9 1 The real party in controversy rule looks to the state statute
pursuant to which the organization was created, or the state con-
tract law under which the organization was formed, to determine
how the organization's members should be treated for jurisdictional
purposes. 92
But any approach that purports to decide who, among the mem-
bers of an investment group, are the "real parties" to the contro-
versy will not necessarily reflect commercial reality. Roles assigned
to categories of investment interests, such as trust beneficiaries or
limited partners, need not represent who actually stands to win or
lose by the controversy's resolution. This point is well illustrated by
the anomalous treatment given to business trusts by the Court's real
party analysis in Navarro. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Navarro, some federal courts had decided that business trusts were
to be treated as unincorporated associations and thus, under United
Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc.,93 each of the benefi-
ciary investors had his own citizenship for diversity purposes."
These courts observed that business trusts do not in fact resemble
ordinary trusts,95 and that there is an analytical consistency to look-
ing beyond the trust form for diversity purposes when it is ignored
for tax purposes."6 In addition, there are state law jurisdictional
91. Several commentators have made a case for the real party in controversy test.
See Rachel F. Best, Note, Who Are the Real Parties in Interest for Purposes of
Determining Diversity Jurisdiction for Limited Partnerships?, 61 WAsm U. LQ
1051, 1066-67 (1984); Jim Breckenridge, Note, Diversity Jurisdiction over Unincor-
porated Business Entities: The Real Party in Interest as a Jurisdictional Rule, 56
TEx. L. REv. 243, 249-50 (1978) [hereinafter Jurisdiction over Unincorporated Enti-
ties]; Robert J. Kopecky, Comment, Limited Partnerships and Federal Diversity Ju-
risdiction, 45 U. CHL L. REv. 384, 418 (1978).
92. See Jurisdiction over Unincorporated Business Entities, supra note 91, at
247-50 (arguing that the real party in controversy rule should govern because "diver-
sity jurisdiction intimately involves state law with federal law" and thus state law
should be the focus).
93. 382 U.S. 145 (1965). See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
94. E.g., Belle View Apartments v. Realty Refund Trust, 602 F.2d 668, 669 (4th
Cir. 1979); Riverside Memorial Mausoleum, Inc. v. UMET Trust, 581 F.2d 62, 65 (3d
Cir. 1978); see also Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. at 466 n.1 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases).
95. Carey v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 794, 795 (N.D. I1. 1976); Jim Wal-
ters Investors v. Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
96. Larwin Mortgage Investors v. Riverdrive Mall, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 97, 100 (S.D.
Tex. 1975) (discussing Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935)). But see
Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. at 465 n.15 (dismissing the Morrissey tax ruling
as "simply irrelevant").
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rules that do not distinguish business trusts from unincorporated
associations-"'
The Navarro majority chose not to acknowledge these realities.
They may have been unwilling to relinquish a simple rule-that
trustees are the real parties-for the organization analysis approach
urged upon the Court, which the Court said entailed "serious diffi-
culties" because it required a case-by-case examination of the inves-
tors' roles in the business decisions.9 8 The Court's reliance on trust
principles, however, overlooks the commercial reality that business
trusts are fundamentally different from traditional trusts. Business
trusts "have the distinctive feature of being created to enable the
participants to carry on a business and divide the gains which ac-
crue from their common undertaking."99 A business trust contains
only one class of investors, the beneficiaries, for whose benefit the
trustees manage the assets. 100 Indeed, the trustees' fiduciary obliga-
tions prohibit them from profiting at the beneficiaries' expense. 0 1
Although the beneficiaries have been determined not to be the
proper parties to bring suit because they do not hold legal title to
the property and their participation in trust affairs is greatly lim-
ited, it is their interests, and their interests alone, that are served by
the organization. Consequently, the real party in controversy rule as
applied in Navarro gives unwarranted preferential diversity treat-
ment to business trusts.
10 2
97. E.g., Shaw v. Cousins Mortgage & Equity Invs., 236 S.E.2d 919, 922 (Ga.
App. 1977); Loomis Land & Cattle Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 533 S.W.2d
420, 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Grenco Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Brooker, 211 S.E.2d
33, 34 (Va. 1975).
98. See Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. at 464 n.13 ("The relative simplicity
of this established principle ... is one of its virtues .... The analysis proposed by
the dissent ... could present serious difficulties for district courts called upon to
determine questions of diversity jurisdiction.") (citations omitted).
99. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 360 (1935).
Traditional trusts, on the other hand, exist to conserve the property for the benefi-
ciaries in accordance with the settlor's estate planning purposes; investment gains are
incidental to the traditional trust's purpose. 3 ZOLMAN CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS § 43.03 (1991).
100. 3 CAvrrCH, supra note 99, § 43.1612].
101. See, e.g., Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barnes, 642 F. Supp. 917, 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying Missouri law); Flynn v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 137 N.E.2d
71, 77 (Ill. 1956) (discussing the trustee's duty to maximize the beneficiaries' profit).
102. According to the real party in controversy test urged upon the Court in
Carden, only the general partner in a limited partnership would be said to be the real
party. But the general partner in a limited partnership may be nothing more than a
corporation formed solely for shielding the limited partner from liability. An attrac-
tive way to structure a limited partnership is for a limited partner investor to form a
corporation and hold all of the corporation's stock. The corporation is then used as
the sole general partner. Provided proper capitalization and other formalities are
maintained, this structure gives the limited partner investor the same limited liability
as if a corporation had been formed, without adverse corporate tax consequences. See
H. HAYNSWORTH, SELECTING THE FORM OF A SMALL BUSINEss ENTITY § 3.06, at 102-03
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A rule that requires the court to examine in each case who is re-
ally behind the lawsuit is overly burdensome and analytically unnec-
essary if a clear distinction can be made based on the choice of orga-
nizational form. Rather than pretend to make meaningful
distinctions about who, among the limitless varieties of investors in
particular business organizations, really constitute the "citizens" in
the controversy, a more workable approach is to focus on what in-
vestors should expect from their choice of business entity. The fol-
lowing discussion demonstrates that such a distinction can be made
and that it is consistent with the purposes of diversity jurisdiction
and with investor expectations.
HI. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PURPOSES OF DIvERsITY
JURISDICTION
The preceding discussion suggests that the courts' various ap-
proaches to defining the diversity jurisdiction requirements for busi-
ness organizations are confusing and analytically flawed. A unified
approach that takes into account business organizational realities
and the purposes of diversity jurisdiction is needed.
A. The Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction
When Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux, 0 3 in which the Supreme Court held that
a corporation "is certainly not a citizen"'1 for jurisdictional pur-
poses, he observed that:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties
of every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself
either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it
has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different
states.
10 5
This fear of state court discrimination against non-citizens is the
"traditional, and most often cited, explanation of the purpose of di-
versity jurisdiction . . . ." o Some commentators believe that while
(1985). In this scenario, the corporate general partner is not truly a "real" party be-
hind the enterprise.
103. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
104. Id. at 86.
105. Id. at 87.
106. 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDuRE § 3601
(1984). Justice Frankfurter, a leading critic of diversity jurisdiction, found "the desire
of the Framers to assure out-of-state litigants courts free from susceptibility to poten-
tial local bias" to be the overriding reason for diversity jurisdiction. Lumbermen's
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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fears of local bias in general played a part in the creation of diver-
sity jurisdiction, the more precise reason for diversity jurisdiction
was to facilitate interstate commerce. 10 7 Apparently, the Constitu-
tion's framers had reason to be concerned about protectionist debtor
relief legislation,108 and diversity jurisdiction has been credited with
"fostering . . . investment in the emergent nation."'' 09 Some have
doubted that justice is really served by providing out-of-state liti-
gants with a federal forum option that in-state litigants do not
have.110 Yet diversity jurisdiction's continued existence clearly must
107. See James W. Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past,
Present, and Future, 43 TEx. L. REV. 1, 16 (1964).
108. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 141-42; Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis
of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 496-97 (1928).
109. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 107, at 17.
Many other arguments have been made to justify diversity jurisdiction, among
them a contention that the federal courts offer "a better quality of justice than state
courts." 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13, 1 0.71[3.-2], at 716. One note-
worthy response to this contention is that if the federal courts do provide a superior
quality of justice, then the goal should be to use them as a model to improve the state
courts, not to expand federal jurisdiction. Kramer, supra note 1, at 118. Concerns
such as these need to be taken into account in deciding whether there is a continued
need for diversity jurisdiction in general. If, as a policy matter, one assumes that the
federal courts need to be made available to as wide a group as possible, then concerns
such as these argue for the most unrestrictive diversity rules. In the business organi-
zation context, this goal would be facilitated by giving citizenship status to unincor-
porated associations, thereby permitting courts to exclude investor citizenship from
the diversity analysis.
Of course, this approach would expand the federal court caseload and require the
courts to deal with difficult threshold jurisdictional questions every time a group
claims to have qualifying association status. In view of the strong opposition in the
courts and among commentators against imposing such burdens on an already over-
taxed system, this Article assumes that the preferred result is a rule that is as narrow
as possible but nevertheless is consistent with investor expectations.
110. Justice Frankfurter concluded that diversity jurisdiction actually discrimi-
nated "against citizens of the [forum] State in favor of litigants from without the
[forum] State." Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 55 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). His view was that "[i]nstead of protecting out-of-state
litigants against discrimination by state courts," diversity jurisdiction enables liti-
gants to avoid state court when the named opponent, by "fortuitous circumstance," is
deemed to have out-of-state citizenship by operation of the diversity rules. Id. at 55-
57.
Justice Frankfurter's criticisms were made before the 1958 modification of the fed-
eral statute by which a corporation is deemed to have citizenship in the state in
which "it has its principal place of business" as well as in its state of incorporation.
Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1988)). This amendment softens, but does not entirely elimi-
nate, the force of his comment that:
There is, to be sure, a kind of irony for corporate defendants to discover
that two can play at the game of working, to use a colloquial term, the
perverse potentialities of diversity jurisdiction. But it is not the less unrea-
son and no greater fairness for a citizen of the forum to gain a discrimina-
tory advantage over fellow citizens of his State, than it is for an out-of-state
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turn on a perceived need for a neutral forum to mitigate state court
unfairness.
If protection from local bias and commercial favoritism are the
main reasons why federal courts are made available on the basis of
diversity of citizenship, then distinctions among various business or-
ganizations should be based on meaningful differences in investors'
expectations about entitlement to such protection. Yet the courts
seem to have concluded that business organizations have become too
complex and conceptually interrelated to permit any meaningful
and sustainable distinctions. They have struggled with shaky doctri-
nal walls and determinations of real parties in making their distinc-
tions, often citing burdens on the federal courts, rather than analyti-
cal conviction, as their rationale."' The Supreme Court itself was
compelled to acknowledge that its resolutions "can validly be char-
acterized as technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy
considerations raised by the changing realities of business
organization."11
An examination of why investors choose a particular business or-
ganization, however, shows that the special treatment accorded by
the courts to corporate shareholders is, in fact, consistent with mod-
ern investor expectations. Incorporation is a different undertaking
than the formation of any other business organization. Investors
who do not incorporate are choosing, for one reason or another, an
organizational form that does not analytically distinguish the inves-
tors from their enterprise, which is a distinction with important
practical consequences. Investors expect that the choice to incorpo-
rate or not to incorporate will fundamentally affect the extent to
citizen to secure more than the same treatment given local citizens, by go.
ing to a federal court for the adjudication of state-created rights.
Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. at 57 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). Frankfurter was not persuaded that the option of a federal forum for corporate
plaintiffs was sufficient reason to warrant continuance of diversity jurisdiction:
[N]o great public interest or libertarian principle is at stake in the desire of
a corporation which happens to have been chartered in the District of Co-
lumbia, to pursue its claim against a citizen of Maryland in the federal
court in Maryland on the theory that the right of this artificial citizen of
the District of Columbia cannot be vindicated in the State courts of
Maryland.
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 651 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter's views have been bolstered by recent com-
mentary that questions whether local bias is real or merely perceived, and that ob-
serves that "many other types of bias are far more prevalent today and far more
likely to influence litigation than bias against citizens of other states." Kramer, supra
note 1, at 120. The availability of insurance is one such bias. Id. Also, federal court
juries are drawn from the same populace from which state court juries are drawn, and
there is reason to doubt that federal judges will necessarily be more neutral than
state judges. Id.
111. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4.
112. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196 (1990).
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which they will be treated as individuals with an existence apart
from their enterprise. This choice provides a sound basis for deter-
mining when the investor should be excused from the complete di-
versity requirements, and when the protections of the federal forum
should be made available based solely on the imputed citizenship of
the collective entity.
B. Business Organizations, Investor Expectations, and the
Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court observed in Carden that there is "a wide as-
sortment of artificial entities possessing different powers and charac-
teristics . . . composed of various classes of members with varying
degrees of interest and control." 113 Investors trying to select a form
of business entity find that the various forms share many important
characteristics to one degree or another. The corporation, however,
can be analytically separated from other business forms by its
unique, separate existence from its investors.
1. "Corporateness"
The essence of "corporateness" is an entity's existence apart from
its investors. The notion that a separate jural personality can
emerge from a group of natural persons doing business dates back to
several centuries before Christ.'1 4 Although incorporation suffered
from some initial distrust in the United States,115 by the beginning
of the nineteenth century it was a widely accepted legal form for
doing business. Chief Justice Marshall described the essence of
"corporateness" in the famous Trustees of Dartmouth College10
case as follows:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and ex-
isting only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law,
it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very exis-
tence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the
object for which it was created. Among the most important are im-
mortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality;
properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are
considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. They
enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold prop-
erty without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless
necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting
it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bod-
ies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities, that
113. Id. at 197.
114. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 468 (T. Cooley 3d ed. 1884).
115. See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 2.
116. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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corporations were invented, and are in use.'"7
The historical uniqueness of the corporate form has modern
ramifications.11 Incorporation enables investors to be shielded from
personal liability; provided that the corporate form is duly formed
and legitimately maintained, shareholders are not liable for corpo-
rate debts beyond the extent of their investment in the enterprise.'1
Jural status also follows from the separate entity concept and is an
integral element of the corporate form.12 0
From an investor's perspective, probably the most important ram-
ification of separate entity status is treatment of the corporation as
a separate taxpayer. 2 ' The law governing corporate taxation differs
in many ways from the rules governing individual taxpayers, includ-
ing the tax rates imposed. 22 The most significant difference is a
double tax on profits. One tax is imposed on the entity for its earn-
ings, and then the corporation's shareholders are taxed at individual
rates on the same earnings to the extent the shareholders receive
them as distributions.1 2 The entity-level corporate tax is in a sense
the quid pro quo for the advantages of entity status. In Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 24 the imposition of the corporate tax was held to
be constitutional because it was "laid upon the privileges which ex-
ist in conducting business with the advantages which inhere in the
corporate capacity of those taxed, and which are not enjoyed by pri-
vate firms or individuals."'2 5 Thus, the special advantages of
"corporateness" make the double tax permissible.
The entity-level tax has been described as "the weightiest criti-
117. Id. at 636.
118. The first uniform legislation for corporations was proposed by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in 1928. 1 FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 2.10. The Com-
missioners' Uniform Business Corporation Act was adopted by only a few states; in
1943 it was renamed as a "Model Act," and in 1969 it was extensively revised. Id.; see
id. § 2.20. In 1984, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act was adopted by the
American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Laws, of the Section of Corpo-
rations, Banking and Business Law. Id. § 2.20. Fifteen states have adopted the Re-
vised Act wholesale; most other states have substantially adopted it or have incorpo-
rated many of its provisions into versions of the former Model Act. Id.; 1 Model
Business Corp. Act Ann. xxxiv-xxxiv.viii (Prentice Hall Supp. 1991).
119. Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 6.22 (1984).
120. Id. § 3.02(1) (1984).
121. See 1 CAvrrCH, supra note 99, § 3.01 (stating that tax factors are often the
prevailing factor in the choice of entity).
122. Currently, the corporate tax rate is higher than the individual rate for taxa-
ble income greater than $143,525. Tax Rate Differences, [1991 Index] Stand. Fed.
Tax Rep. (CCH) (U.S. Tax Cas.) 1 227.02 (1991). While this suggests that the corpo-
rate form may be desirable for small-scale enterprises, the tax laws make this deter-
mination far more complex than a simple application of tax rates.
123. See generally HOWARD E. ABRAts & RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, FEDERAL COR-
PoRATE TAXATiON T 1.01 (1987).
124. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
125. Id. at 162.
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cism of the corporate form of business organization . *...,, The
impact of double taxation can be outweighed by other considera-
tions, especially for large enterprises that can take advantage of de-
ductions for salaries, fringe benefits, and other expenses that offset
earnings.
127
Corporations clearly stand alone at one end of the business organ-
ization spectrum. 12 Indeed, the goal of investors who choose other
organizational forms is often to enjoy as closely as possible the
unique advantages of the corporate form, especially limited liability,
while avoiding as much as possible its adverse consequences, espe-
cially entity-level taxation. While investors in other business organi-
zations try to approximate "corporateness," they are nonetheless
choosing an entity that differs from a corporation in important theo-
retical and practical ways.
2. Unincorporated Organizations
The partnership form of business organization has never been re-
ified to the extent of the corporation. 29 In partnership analysis,
126. 1 CAVITCH, supra note 99, § 3.0411].
127. See HAYNSWORTH, supra note 102, § 4.06.
One notable exception to the entity approach to corporate taxation is "Subchapter
S" status. Small scale enterprises can enjoy the benefits of incorporation without the
disadvantages of double taxation and other unfavorable features of otherwise applica-
ble corporate tax rules if they qualify for this status. There are several eligibility
requirements, including a limit to thirty-five shareholders and only one class of stock.
I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A), (D) (West Supp. 1991). These and other restrictions function-
ally limit Subchapter S status to relatively "small" businesses. See id. § 1362(a)(1);
see generally RICHARD D. BLAU ET AL., S CORPORATIONS: FEDERAL TAXATION §§ 1.01,
7.02-.04 (1990) (discussing the attractiveness of Subchapter S status for small-scale
enterprises). This special tax incentive given to small businesses does not fundamen-
tally undercut the overall different approach corporations receive because of their
separate entity status.
128. Corporations have become the entity of choice for large-scale, interstate en-
terprises. According to government statistics, 87% of enterprises with income of $1
million or more are corporations. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE. STAnSTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 521 (1990) (In 1986, 562,000 cor-
porations, 44,000 partnerships, and 38,000 sole proprietorships had income of $1 mil-
lion or more.). On the whole, corporate income accounts for almost 10 times as much
as all other forms of organization combined, id. ($8,282 billion for corporations; $938
billion for all others), even though other business forms outnumber corporations by
four-to-one, id. (14,097,000 partnerships and sole proprietorships, 3,429,000 corpora-
tions). Most of the shareholders in these large-scale enterprises would tend to be pas-
sive investors, who do not expect to play any role in the characterization of a corpora-
tion's jurisdictional status.
129. "Reification" is the theoretical process by which an abstraction becomes ma-
terial. As one commentator aptly summarized:
We first perceive the associates, human beings, engaged in a common en-
terprise with a common purpose. Thereupon, in our consideration of them
we reify them as a group, and we get "it," the "association as such." By this
instinctive process the association becomes an entity, a thing separate and
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there has been a tension between the "entity theory," such as that
employed with corporations, and the "aggregate theory," by which
all partnership investors are treated as individual entities. When the
uniform partnership law was taking shape, the choices were de-
scribed as follows:
Under the entity theory the partnership is a legal person distinct
from the members of the firm. Many of the principles of the law of
corporations become applicable and, indeed, the law of partnership
would logically become a branch of the law of corporations if this
theory were adopted and consistently followed.
Under the aggregate theory, on the other hand, the partners are
joint owners of the partnership property, and joint obligors and ob-
ligees of claims due from or to the partnership, though some modi-
fications of the ordinary rules of joint ownership may be necessary
because of the particular character of partnership business."30
Some argued that the entity theory should be adopted for partner-
ships, but opponents prevailed and generally the partnership re-
tained its "pluralistic" form.13 ' The partnership does have some en-
tity-like features, however. For instance, the partnership can own
property, 32 and partnership property is applied to satisfy partner-
ship indebtedness before the individual partners' assets can be
reached.lss But each partner is jointly and severally liable for part-
nership obligations,1 34 and the uniform partnership laws do not give
the partnership entity status for purposes of suing and being
sued.135
The partnership also receives both entity and aggregate treatment
in the manner in which it is taxed. Partnership taxation is a notori-
ously complex subject, and the mixing of entity and aggregate con-
distinct from the associates.
Wesley A. Sturges, Unincorporated Associates as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J.
383, 397 (1924).
130. Samuel Williston, The Uniform Partnership Act, With Some Remarks on
Other Uniform Commercial Laws, 63 U. PA. L REv. 196, 207 (1915).
131. In Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937), Learned Hand described
how Dean Ames led the struggle in attempting to give the partnership form jural
existence, and how the struggle died with him. See also United States v. A & P
Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 127-28 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("In this
country the entity theory has not in general been extended to the partnership."). For
a general discussion of the Uniform Partnership Act and the entity theory, see, e.g.,
A. Ladru Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate
or an Entity?, 16 VAD.". RLv. 377 (1963); Judson A. Crane, The Uniform Partner-
ship Act and Legal Persons, 29 HIRv. L. RPv. 838 (1916).
132. UNw. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 8, 6 U.L.A. 115 (1969).
133. Id. § 38, 6 U.L.A. at 456-57.
134. Id. § 15, 6 U.L.. at 174.
135. State law does sometimes give partnerships jural status. This is for proce-
dural convenience, however, and is not an integral element of the partnership form.
See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
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cepts is blamed for the resultant confusion.136 The entity concept
prevails in the way certain transactions between partners and part-
nerships are treated as if they were between an entity and its inves-
tors.1 3 7 The partnership possesses the additional entity characteris-
tics of having its own tax year' 3s and having its partnership taxable
income computed separately. 139 But in the essential feature of who
pays the tax, the partnership is not treated as an entity. The part-
nership is treated as a flow-through conduit, and the individual
partners-not the partnership-are taxed. "40 Investors in a partner-
ship, therefore, select a form of doing business that treats them in a
fundamentally different way than corporations. They have a much
more direct relationship to the income and losses that may result
from their efforts.
The modern limited partnership1 4 1 is a variation of the partner-
ship form with some corporation-like features. Its existence depends
on the filing of a certificate with the state,14 2 and limited partner
investors can bring a derivative action in the right of the limited
partnership.1 4 3 Similarities such as these have caused some to char-
acterize the limited partnership as a "pseudo-corporation" that de-
serves "status for diversity purposes that is comparable to a corpo-
ration's status."1 4
4
136. See generally 1 WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNER-
SHIPS AND PARTNERS 1.02 [3] (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the confusion that results
from the blending of aggregate and entity concepts).
137. I.R.C. § 707 (1988).
138. Id. § 706(b)(1).
139. Id. § 703.
140. Id. § 701.
141. Although limited partnerships in various forms can be found at common law,
they were first legislatively sanctioned in 1822 in New York. Act of Apr. 17, 1822, ch.
CCXLIV, 1822 N.Y. Laws 259, repealed by Act of Dec. 10, 1828, ch. 21, 1828 N.Y.
Laws 54. For a discussion of the limited partnership's history, see, e.g., Lucille T.
Freedberg, The Shield of the Limited Partnership, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 561, 564-65
(1983); Richard A. Mann & Barry S. Roberts, Unincorporated Business Associations:
An Overview of Their Advantages and Disadvantages, 1978 TULSA L. J. 1, 28; Com-
ment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1463,
1463-64 (1965). Limited partnerships offered an attractive limited liability alternative
as opposed to corporations, especially during an era when much more was required to
obtain a corporate charter than is necessary today. See Mann & Roberts, supra, at
28. A Uniform Limited Partnership Act was approved in 1916, UNIF. LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP AcT, 6 U.L.A. 561 (1969), and was eventually adopted in all states except
Louisiana. Freedberg, supra, at 565. A Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Ac, 6 U.L.A. 270 (Supp. 1991), was approved in
1976 and this revised act was amended in 1985. This structure has been adopted by
all states except Alaska, Louisiana, Maine, and Vermont. 6 U.L.A. 190, 239-40 (Supp.
1991). Alaska, Maine, and Vermont retained the 1916 Act. Id. at 190.
142. REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 201, 6 U.L.A. 292 (Supp. 1991).
143. Id. § 1001, 6 U.L.A. at 401.
144. G. David Porter, Note, "Incorporating" Limited Partnerships into Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction: Correcting Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 65 NOTRE: DAME L. REV.
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Yet there are important distinctions between a limited partner-
ship and a corporation. Unlike the uniform corporation laws, the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act does not give the partnership the
right to sue or be sued in its own name. 4 5 Limited partnerships also
fall into the same category as general partnerships in the way they
are taxed. Although both aggregate and entity concepts are em-
ployed, the limited partnership is a flow-through entity and, concep-
tually, the individual investors have a direct relationship to enter-
prise income and losses. 4 '
The limited partnership's similarities to the corporate form have
resulted in special rules for determining when the partnership loses
this flow-through treatment. These regulations, which provide that a
limited partnership that looks too much like a corporation will be
taxed as such,147 identify four distinguishing characteristics to be
avoided by a limited partnership if it is not to be recharacterized
and taxed at the entity level."54 First, partnerships cannot have
"continuity of life" in the same sense as corporations.1 0 Second, a
partfiership is corporate in nature if the interests of its investors in
the organization are freely transferable. 10 Third, a partnership must
not insulate all of its members from personal liability for the organi-
zation's debts.' 15 Finally, a partnership looks too much like a corpo-
ration if its management is so centralized that a single partner or
group of partners has continuing exclusive authority over the part-
287, 304 (1990). See also Justice O'Connor's comparison of business organizations in
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 202-03 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145. The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act requires the limited partner-
ship to maintain a registered office and a registered agent, Revised Unif. Limited
Partnership Act § 104, 6 U.L.A. 282 (Supp. 1991), but this does not give the limited
partnership the right to sue and be sued as an entity. See N.E. & R. Partnership v.
Stone, 745 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Mo. App. 1988) (construing the Missouri version of §
104).
146. The tax code does not distinguish between general and limited partnerships
in overall tax treatment I.R.C. § 761 (West 1988) (making no distinction between
general and limited partnerships); 1 WILLIAM S McKEE or AL, FmERAL T vxATioN OF
PARTNERSHIP AND PARTNERS 9 2.01 (1], at 2-2 (1990) ("The distinctions between gen-
eral and limited partnerships are based almost entirely on nontax considerations.")
147. Technically, the limited partnership is taxed as a corporation if it is classified
as an "association," as opposed to a "partnership." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)
(1991).
148. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3).
149. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1). To avoid recharacterization, partnerships must not
provide for automatic continuance of the enterprise notwithstanding the departure or
incapacity of any member, especially a general partner. Id.
150. Id. § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
151. Id. § 301.7701-2(d)(1). By definition, limited partners have limited liability,
so the focus of this inquiry is on the general partners. As long as there is a general
partner with substantial assets, who is more than an empty facade shielding the lim-
ited partners, the limited partners will be deemed not to have personal liability. This
provides the creditors with at least some recourse to seek satisfaction of their claims.
Id.; see id. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) & (2).
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nership business. 152 Thus, in the very important area of taxation, the
limited partnership must not be a "quasi-corporation" or else it will
lose the important tax advantage of not being a corporation.
An unusual feature of limited partnerships is the class of limited
partners themselves. Limited partners are permitted to avoid any
risk beyond the amount of their investments.15 They must not exert
too much control over the organization if they wish to retain such
limited liability. The line between passivity and too much control is
"the single most difficult issue facing lawyers who use the limited
partnership form of organization.' '1 4 Consultation, participation in
most significant business decisions, and even control of the general
partner are all activities that do not constitute excessive involve-
ment in the limited partnership.1 5 Even a limited partner who is
deemed to have participated in control is not personally liable un-
less the aggrieved party was misled into "reasonably believing, based
upon the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a
general partner. ' 15 8 Thus, a limited partner can remain an active,
direct participant in the limited partnership's business. In this re-
spect, limited partners are fundamentally different from sharehold-
ers, who must act through exercise of their voting power.
Notwithstanding the similarities that do exist between limited
partnerships and corporations, there are fundamental theoretical
and practical differences. Neither general nor limited partnerships
exist apart from their investors, and their tax and other characteris-
tics make them a clearly distinct investment option.'
57
152. Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(1). General partners must have significant rights in the
enterprise for the enterprise to avoid the risk of being deemed to have excessively
centralized management. Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2).
153. REVISED UNIF. LIMITzD PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303, 6 U.L.A. 325 (Supp. 1991).
154. Id. prefatory note, 6 U.L.A. at 241 (Supp. 1991).
155. Id. § 303, 6 U.L.A. at 325.
156. Id.
157. A few states, in particular Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio, have statutory
partnership associations that very closely resemble corporations. MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 20.91-20.106 (Callaghan 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:3-1 to 3-29 (West 1940 &
Supp. 1991-1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1783.01-.12 (Baldwin 1985). The Supreme
Court refused to grant entity status to a similar form of partnership in Great S. Fire
Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900). See supra text accompanying notes 33-
36. The statutory partnership association statutes give the association the capacity to
sue and be sued, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 20.100; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:3-8; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1783.06, and for the most part individual members are not personally liable
for the partnership's debts, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 20.92; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:3-9; 01110
REV. CODE ANN. § 1783.08. At least one partnership association has been deemed to be
so much like a corporation that it should be taxed as such. See Giant Auto Parts,
Ltd. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 307 (1949), modified by 14 T.C. 579 (1950). In view of
the possibility of tax recharacterization, the absence of modern case law defining the
nature of this organizational form, and the availability of modern limited partner-
ships and Subchapter S corporations, the partnership association may be obsolete.
New Jersey's laws confirm this conclusion by prohibiting the creation of new statu-
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The same is true for other unincorporated organizations, including
business trusts. Business trusts used to be a common organizational
form for holding real estate. The Supreme Court has defined a busi-
ness trust, also called a "Massachusetts Trust" because of its ori-
gins, as
consisting essentially of an arrangement whereby property is con-
veyed to trustees, in accordance with the terms of an instrument of
trust, to be held and managed for the benefit of such persons as
may from time to time be the holders of transferable certificates
issued by the trustees showing the shares into which the beneficial
interest in the property is divided.15 8
Business trusts apparently emerged as a mechanism for holding real
estate when corporate charters were difficult to obtain for such pur-
poses.159 Business trusts offer the corporate-like advantages of cen-
tralized management, continuity of existence apart from their bene-
ficiaries, and insulation of the beneficiaries from liability. a0  As a
trust, the beneficiaries are not necessary parties to actions, and state
laws permit suits to be brought against the trust by service upon the
trustee.16
The similarities between business trusts and corporations once
caused the trusts to be deemed "associations" and thus subject to
tax at the entity level.1 62 Corporate tax treatment, and the availabil-
ity of sophisticated limited partnership syndicates, eventually made
business trusts an unpopular form for doing business.0 3 The trust
form was reinvigorated in 1960, however, by the Internal Revenue
Code provisions for real estate investment trusts (REITs),1'0 which
granted business trusts favorable tax treatment. 1 In general, the
real estate investment trust provisions enable qualifying trusts to
distribute investment income to the beneficiary investors without
being subjected to an entity-level tax.1 66
Although business trusts share many organizational features with
the corporate form, including the transferability of interests without
affecting continuity, and the limitation on the personal liability of
tory partnership associations. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:3-1 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
158. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146-47 (1924).
159. State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 41 N.E.2d 30, 34 (Mass. 1942).
160. 3 CAVrrCH, supra note 99, § 43.05.
161. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 182, § 6 (West 1987).
162. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
163. 3 CAVITCH, supra note 99, § 44.01, at 134.
164. I.R.C. §§ 856-60 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
165. See generally 3 CAvrrcH, supra note 99, §§ 44.01-.05. (explaining that real
estate investment trusts are taxable as corporations but can avoid the double tax by
meeting certain minimum distribution requirements). See id. § 44.04.
166. See generally Thomas F. Allen & Frederick L. Fisher, Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts, TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO (BNA 107-5th A-1 1990).
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the participants, 6 7 investors in business trusts nonetheless choose a
form with significantly different features than those of a corpora-
tion, chief among them unique and very complex tax conse-
quences.168 Indeed, the real value of the business trust is to enable
real estate investors to obtain some corporation-like benefits without
the corporate tax consequences. They choose the trust form pre-
cisely because it does not require them to account for the existence
of a separate entity for tax purposes.
The foregoing discussion of various business organizations is not
exhaustive. There are, of course, other choices available to inves-
tors.16 All forms need not be envisioned to see that although there
are similarities and distinctions among the various organizations,
corporations clearly stand alone at one end of the organizational
spectrum. Other business organizations may share some of the cor-
poration's entity characteristics, but none has the special theoretical
and practical distinction accorded to those who incorporate.
Thus, modern investor preferences and expectations provide
strong theoretical support for the Supreme Court's longstanding rule
that only corporations may avoid having their investors' citizenship
considered in the diversity analysis. A clear reaffirmation of this rule
would have the desirable result of making the diversity calculation
predictable, which in turn would enable investors to understand
more clearly the jurisdictional consequences of their choice of entity,
and at the same time preserve judicial resources by avoiding case-
specific examinations of particular entities' similarities to, or dissim-
ilarities from, the corporate form.
IV. UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND REPRESENTATIVE LITIGANTS
Given most courts' demonstrated reluctance to struggle with the
question whether a business organization should be treated as a sep-
arate entity for diversity jurisdiction purposes, one would think that
a decision requiring all of an association's members to be treated as
separate citizens would be dispositive of the federal forum's availa-
bility. But the matter is not that simple. The federal rules provide a
mechanism that can be employed by at least some unincorporated
entities to avoid the otherwise preclusive effect of the complete di-
167. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935) (comparing a busi-
ness trust with the corporate form).
168. See HAYNSWORTH, supra note 102, § 1.05(c) (discussing reasons for selecting a
business trust).
169. Among the other various forms of entities, joint stock companies have re-
ceived the most attention in the jurisdictional analysis. Joint stock companies are
partnership-like groups with the corporate characteristic of transferrable ownership
interests represented by shares. Some statutes give joint stock companies the power
to sue and be sued as an entity; unlike a corporation, however, a joint stock company
is formed by contractual agreement, not by grace of the state, and it does not have an
existence distinct from its members. 2 CAVITCH, supra note 99, § 42.04(1]-[2].
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versity requirement. The mechanism is designation of only some
members of the association, namely those who can satisfy the di-
verse citizenship requirement, as representative litigants under the
federal rules. 170 The mechanism can be employed in the designation
of representative defendants as well as in the selection of represen-
tative plaintiffs."'
Rule 23.2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "Actions Relat-
ing to Unincorporated Associations," provides that "[a]n action
brought by or against the members of an unincorporated association
as a class by naming certain members as representative parties may
be maintained only if it appears that representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the association and its
members."'7 2 Rule 23.2 was enacted with the entity status rules in
mind. The advisory committee's note states that
[a]lthough an action by or against representatives of the member-
ship of an unincorporated association has often been viewed as a
class action, the real or main purpose of this characterization has
been to give "entity treatment" to the association when for formal
reasons it cannot sue or be sued as a jural person under Rule
17(b).173
For business organizations that have entity status under the federal
diversity rules-namely corporations-complete diversity may be
achieved notwithstanding common citizenship of some of the organi-
zation's members and the opposing party. Rule 23.2 can achieve the
same result for business organizations that do not have entity status
by selective designation of representative litigants.
1 7
'
In some circuits, Rule 23.2 has been interpreted narrowly as being
available only for use by unincorporated associations that are not
allowed entity treatment under state law. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(b), federal jural capacity is governed by forum
state law. 7 5 According to the narrow interpretation of Rule 23.2, the
170. Diversity in a class action is determined by the citizenship of the named class
representatives. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 364-66 (1921).
171. FED. R Civ. P. 23.2.
172. Id. For the complete text of Rule 23.2, see supra note 9.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2 advisory committee's note.
174. Two significant limitations on the use of Rule 23.3 are readily apparent. As a
practical matter, only plaintiffs can use Rule 23.2 to achieve diversity, either with
respect to themselves or the defendants, because only plaintiffs name the representa-
tive litigants. A second limitation is the minimum jurisdictional amount requirement.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the diversity statute as requiring that each mem-
ber of a class of plaintiffs satisfy the minimum jurisdictional amount "in contro-
versy." Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336-38 (1969). This requirement could keep
organizations with many investors from suing as a class, because of the corresponding
large minimum jurisdictional amount, thereby seriously undercutting Rule 23.2's use-
fulness as a procedural convenience.
175. The full text of the current version of FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) provides that:
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Rule was intended to give litigants who do not have the option of
suing or being sued as an entity in state court the opportunity to
avoid the problems associated with multiple litigants.' A recent
First Circuit case considered Rule 23.2 in the context of the larger
diversity jurisdiction picture and adopted this narrow view. In
Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance Co. v. Medical Malprac-
tice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of Massachusetts,'" the court de-
cided that the device of naming representative parties to achieve di-
versity jurisdiction, employed by the court in the 1959 case of
Oskoian v. Canuel,178 was no longer good law. Oskoian "pre-dated
Rule 23.2 and therefore did not address the issue of whether the rule
may be used to create diversity jurisdiction or used solely to give
entity treatment to an unincorporated association that has no such
status under state law. '179 According to the First Circuit, if jural sta-
tus is recognized under state law for an unincorporated association,
Rule 23.2 is not available. 8 0
The First Circuit feared expansion of diversity jurisdiction. The
Northbrook court repeated the refrain that "federal court jurisdic-
tion is strictly limited by statute to cases meeting specific criteria"'19
under the statute and that "[p]leas for extension of diversity juris-
diction to hitherto uncovered broad categories of litigants ought to
be made to Congress and not to the courts.'
82
A different line of opinions has been much more receptive to the
class action mechanism for unincorporated associations. In Oskoian
The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative
capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the individ-
ual's domicile. The capacity of d corporation to sue or be sued shall be de-
termined by the law under which it was organized. In all other cases capac-
ity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which
the district court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorpo-
rated association, which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may
sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or
against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and (2) that the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court
of the United States to sue or be sued in a court of the United States is
governed by Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 754 and 959(a).
176. See Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 341-42 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 864 (1958); Lang v. Windsor Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co., 493 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); Suchem, Inc. v. Cent. Aguirre Sugar Co., 52 F.R.D. 348 (D.P.R. 1971).
177. 900 F.2d 476 (1st Cir. 1990).
178. 269 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1959).
179. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Medical Malpractice Joint Under-
writing Ass'n of Mass., 900 F.2d at 479.
180. Id.; see also Peerless Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 735 F. Supp. 452
(D.N.H. 1990).
181. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Medical Malpractice Joint Under-
writing Ass'n of Mass., 900 F.2d at 478.
182. Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145,
150-51 (1965)).
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u. Canuel,8 3 the First Circuit case predating Rule 23.2 that was dis-
tinguished in Northbrook, general class action rules were applied,
and thirteen named defendants were sued as class representatives of
an unincorporated labor organization having more than 50,000 mem-
bers. The defendants argued that the case should be dismissed be-
cause the named defendants lacked the capacity to be sued as repre-
sentatives of the union when the state statute permitted suit against
an unincorporated association by naming its officers. 16 4 The court
held, however, that because that provision was permissive, a com-
mon law action against named members, as representatives of the
class, was still available. Thus, as a matter of federal law, the union
members could be sued and bound by an action under the class ac-
tion rule.18 5
Subsequent cases in some circuits followed the Oskoian approach.
In Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Ass'n, Inc.,18 the defendants,
who were unincorporated association members, asserted that Rule
23.2 was unavailable to the plaintiff because forum state law permit-
ted an association to be sued as an entity. They based their argu-
ment on the advisory committee note's reference to an intent to give
"entity treatment" to associations that were not treated as entities
under state law. The defendants asked the court to hold that Rule
23.2 could be used only when forum state law does not allow an un-
incorporated association to sue or be sued as an entity. The court
refused to do so, however, holding that the plaintiff could amend his
complaint to proceed against the association's members instead of
against the entity itself.1" " Forum state law, while allowing entity
suits, made clear that entity status did not affect the common law
right to sue individual members. 8 "
Similarly, in Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. Mobil Oil
183. 269 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1959).
184. Id. at 314.
185. Id. at 315. At the time, Rule 23(a), which applied to class actions generally,
permitted suit by class representatives who would "fairly insure the adequate repre-
sentation of all" when the right sought to be enforced was "joint, or common." The
current Rule 23.2 was not added until after Oskoian was decided. Courts have gener-
ally not viewed the current rule as a departure from the prior rule. 7C CHARLEs A,
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAC'rICE AND PROCEDURE § 1861 at 219-220 (2d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE] (Rule 23.2 does not represent a departure from
the pre-1966 class action practice). The advisory committee's note accompanying
Rule 23.2 cites Oskoian as authority for use of the class action device. At least one
circuit holds the opinion that the current rule should be read as broadening the avail-
ability of representative actions for unincorporated associations. See Kerney v. Fort
Griffin Fandangle Ass'n, Inc., 624 F.2d 717, 720 (5th Cir. 1980) (purpose of Rule 23.2
"was clearly to enlarge, not contract, the authorization for class actions against unin-
corporated associations").
186. 624 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1980).
187. Id. at 719-20.
188. Id. at 720.
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Corp.,"' a federal district court rejected a restrictive view of the
scope of Rule 23.2 and chose to follow Kerney and Oskoian.9 0 The
court ruled that as long as the members of an unincorporated associ-
ation have the individual capacity under state law to sue or be sued,
the class action device afforded by Rule 23.2 can appropriately be
invoked. The Lumbermen's court concluded that
the broad interpretation of Rule 23.2 reflected in the Kerney and
Oskoian decisions is correct. The language of Rule 23.2 suggests no
"entity treatment" limitation, nor does the advisory committee ref-
erence to "entity treatment" specifically refer to capacity to sue or
be sued as an entity. From the evolution of the legal identity of an
unincorporated association it is apparent that entity treatment al-
lowed a party suing or being sued by an unincorporated association
to avoid the practical difficulties of joining all members of the asso-
ciation. Such "entity treatment" can be achieved by suing the asso-
ciation in its common name or by suing the members of the associ-
ation individually as a class.19'
The Second Circuit recently adopted this broad view of Rule 23.2
and applied it to a limited partnership. In Curley v. Brignoli, Curley
& Roberts Associates,"2 three limited partners brought suit against
their limited partnership, its corporate general partner, and the
chief executive officer of the corporate general partner, alleging vari-
ous breaches of fiduciary duty.193 Because the plaintiffs were limited
partners in the limited partnership defendant, there would be a fail-
ure of complete diversity unless the entity was deemed to have its
own citizenship or a representative action could be broughf.
The Curley court observed that in Carden the Supreme Court had
rendered invalid the Second Circuit's previously adopted rule in Co-
lonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,9'4 "that, in proceedings where a
limited partnership was a party but its limited partners could not
properly be joined under state law, only the citizenship of general
partners was considered for diversity purposes."' 5 On its own initia-
tive, the court went on to consider whether Rule 23.2 was a viable
alternative for meeting the diversity jurisdiction requirements. The
court deemed that it was, expressly rejecting other courts' contrary
interpretation.' The court said that if Rule 23.2 had been intended
to be restricted to organizations not having entity status under state
189. 612 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Idaho 1985).
190. Id. at 1170.
191. Id.
192. 915 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1990).
193. Id. at 82-83.
194. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
195. Curley v. Brignoli, Curley & Roberts Assocs., 915 F.2d at 84.
196. Specifically, the court rejected the First Circuit's holding in Northbrook Ex-
cess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of Mass.,
900 F.2d 476 (1st Cir. 1990), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 177-82.
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law, the text of the rule could have easily so provided, and the draft-
ers "would have simply extended to the diversity realm rule 17(b)'s
grant of association capacity in federal question cases."' "
Curley is important for two reasons. First, it makes a strong case
for reading Rule 23.2 as a mechanism for achieving complete diver-
sity rather than as a narrow, special dispensation to business organi-
zations that do not have entity capacity under state law. Second,
Curley demonstrates how courts can see themselves as unduly con-
strained by the "doctrinal wall" of Carden. The Curley court found
relief from this constraint in the representative litigant rules.
In Curley, the functional similarities between corporations and
limited partners were apparent. The case had been brought as a de-
rivative action, a mechanism deeply rooted in corporate law.'08 Per-
haps the court's eagerness to examine Rule 23.2 was due in part to
the inconsistency of refusing to give the limited partnership entity
status for citizenship purposes when the nature of the action made
it indistinguishable from comparable actions brought against
corporations.
Although the Curley decision went against the trend that had
been developing toward a narrow interpretation of Rule 23.2,'"' the
conclusion reached in Curley is sound as a matter of rule interpreta-
tion. As the Second Circuit observed, it seems odd that the
rulemakers would not have been explicit if they intended for state
entity status to preclude use of Rule 23.2. The advisory committee's
note does describe the "real or main purpose" of the class action
provision as giving "'entity treatment' to the association when for
formal reasons it cannot sue or be sued as a jural person under Rule
17(b),"20 ° but it does not say this is the only purpose and that the
Rule should not be interpreted as going any further.
Interpreted broadly in this manner, Rule 23.2 is a counterweight
to the Supreme Court's rule that as a matter of federal law only
corporations have entity treatment for diversity purposes. Corpora-
tions are citizens in their own right; any other association that hopes
to use the federal forum must do so under Rule 23.2. Such a result
197. Curley v. Brignoli, Curley & Roberts Assocs., 915 F.2d at 87.
198. The stockholders' right to sue in behalf of the corporation was firmly estab-
lished in this country by the middle of the 19th century. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S.
531, 534 (1970).
199. See cases discussed supra in text accompanying notes 175-82; see also Na-
tional Bank of Washington v. Mallery, 669 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (D.D.C. 1987) ("[Clase
law has added a gloss to [Rule 23.2] so that it now appears that an unincorporated
association may sue or be sued as a class only where state law does not allow suit by
or against the group as an entity."); 7C FEDERAL PRAcTIcz, supra note 185, § 1861, at
223 ("the clear trend in cases decided since the adoption of Rule 23.2 has been to
follow the pre-1966 Third Circuit approach to honoring the state law prohibition
against suit").
200. FED. P, Civ. P. 23.2 advisory committee's note.
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seems questionable in view of the policy concerns that have led to so
much criticism of diversity jurisdiction and that have resulted in ju-
dicial reluctance to extend diversity jurisdiction in doubtful
circumstances. 0 1
Indeed, the contrary approach taken by the First Circuit in
Northbrook is persuasive as a matter of federal policy. Although the
First Circuit was not as vocal as other courts have been in articulat-
ing federalism concerns about diversity jurisdiction,2 0 2 the North-
brook court adopted the language of the Supreme Court that
"'[p]leas for extension of the diversity jurisdiction to hitherto un-
covered broad categories of litigants ought to be made to Congress
and not to the courts.' ",203 Whether such restraint is in itself legisla-
tion from the bench can, of course, be debated; the Supreme Court,
however, would probably sanction the First Circuit's approach in
view of the strong position taken in Carden against any leniency in
the rules governing diversity jurisdiction requirements for business
organizations.
If Rule 23.2 is read narrowly-that is, as intended only to "give
'entity treatment' to the association when for formal reasons it can-
not sue or be sued as a jural person ' 204  under forum state
law 05-the rule becomes a mechanism for alleviating the problems
of service and case management entailed in states that refuse to give
entity treatment to unincorporated associations. State courts them-
selves recognize that a decision to afford such "entity treatment" is
merely "a procedural convenience to litigants, not to affect the sub-
stantive rights, liabilities and duties of partners or partnerships."2 00
Entity characterization "provides a simpler means for a plaintiff to
sue [the association's members] as a group" and "relieves a plaintiff
201. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d
1254, 1256-57 (3d Cir. 1977).
203. Northbrook Excess and Surplus Ins. Co. v. Medical Malpractice Joint Under-
writing Ass'n of Mass., 900 F.2d at 478 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H.
Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1965)).
204. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2 advisory committee's note.
205. Entity status under state law-as opposed to entity status under state or
federal law-must be the standard. If Rule 23.2 were interpreted as being unavailable
to an entity that has entity status under state or federal law, then a class action could
never be brought when jurisdiction is based on a federal question because Rule 17(b)
gives capacity in all such cases. Class action suits have been brought in federal ques-
tion cases without serious question about their availability. See, e.g., Management
Television Sys., Inc. v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D. 162 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
206. Watson v. G.C. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 691 P.2d 417, 419 (Nev. 1984). One
state court described its state's entity capacity statute as "manifestly" having been
"enacted for the practical convenience and benefit of the partnership[s], associations,
and companies to which it relates, as well as for the convenience and benefit of credi-
tors, in bringing and prosecuting suits." F.R. Patch Mfg. Co. v. Capeless, 63 A. 938,
939 (Vt. 1906).
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from the task of having to name and personally serve process on
each and every member of the association.1 20 7 Many states have pro-
vided this convenience;20 8 but some do so only for certain unincorpo-
rated organizations or only in limited circumstances, 200 and others
cling to the common law view that only corporations have jural en-
tity status.210 Rule 23.2, therefore, becomes a curious procedural
convenience for business organizations to which the states them-
selves would not extend such a courtesy. The existence of such a
procedural convenience is anomalous in a federal court system
where policy makers and the courts almost uniformly declare the
need to make the federal courts available only when justice so
demands.
Indeed, even if procedural convenience were a satisfactory basis
for broad representative litigant rules, Rule 23.2 is overbroad in its
failure to consider the litigants' need for such a mechanism. Organi-
zations with many investors have a greater chance of shared citizen-
ship, and thus complete diversity is less likely for such organiza-
tions. Yet the more investors there are, the more cumbersome the
service procedures. Although Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to
cases in which "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable," ' Rule 23.2 apparently is not so restricted. Rule
23.2 has been interpreted as not incorporating the numerosity re-
quirement for several reasons: the Rule does not use the words
"class action" to define the nature of the action it creates, which
suggests that the general class action requirements do not apply; it
makes no reference to Rule 23, the general class action rule in which
the numerosity requirement is set forth; and it expressly mentions
one of the four general class action requirements-adequacy of rep-
resentation-implying an intentional omission of the others, includ-
ing numerosity.21 2 Even when Rule 23.2's requirement that the rep-
207. Shortlidge v. Gutoski, 484 A.2d 1083, 1087 (N.H. 1984).
208. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 388 (West 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 814
(1973); see also Orser v. Vierra, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715-16 (1967) (describing the Cali-
fornia law as "a procedural statute, creating a quicker, cleaner and simpler method of
getting [association] members into court"). See also supra note 206.
209. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510:13 (1983) (allowing suit to be brought
against a partnership as an entity if it has more than four partners); MAss. GzN. LAws
ANN. ch. 182, §§ 1, 6 (West 1987) (allowing business trusts that meet state organiza-
tional requirements to be treated as entities); N.Y. Ctv. PRAaC L & R 1025 (McKinney
1976) (allowing partnerships to be treated as entities, but according unincorporated
associations such treatment only in very limited circumstances).
210. E.g., 0 & Y Landmark Assocs. of Va. v. Nordheimer, 725 F. Supp. 578, 581
(D.D.C. 1989) (District of Columbia law); Payne v. Sigma Phi Epsilon, 569 F. Supp.
422, 425 (N.D. W. Va. 1983) (holding that under West Virginia law only cooperative
agricultural marketing associations and common carriers are given entity treatment).
211. FED. R Civ. P. 23(a).
212. See 3B JAMiEs W. MooRE ET J., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcncz
1 23.2.02 (2d ed. 1991).
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resentative parties "will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the association and its members"2 13 is interpreted as implicitly
incorporating the concepts of Rule 23's restrictions on class actions,
the numerosity restriction has been excluded.
2 14
Rule 23.2 badly suffers from lack of clarity in application and in
purpose. Rule 23.2 should not be so easily susceptible of contrary
interpretations in view of the important policy and other concerns at
stake with diversity jurisdiction. If Congress really wants the federal
courts to be available to unincorporated business organizations that
do not qualify for entity treatment under the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence, which seems unlikely, it should confront the issue
squarely and expressly overrule the Court's "doctrinal wall," or at
least clarify the class action rules to make them available to all un-
incorporated organizations, regardless of state entity status.
If, on the other hand, Congress does not want diversity jurisdic-
tion to be so widely available, it should eliminate the procedural
convenience provided by Rule 23.2 and exclude business organiza-
tions from the class action rules. As discussed above in Part III, a
restrictive approach to making the federal courts available to busi-
ness organizations based on diversity of citizenship is justified by
the nature of investor expectations and the purposes of diversity ju-
risdiction. Rule 23.2's "procedural convenience" mechanism is in-
consistent with such an approach and is questionable federal policy.
V. CONCLUSION
In Carden, the Supreme Court took refuge in its perceived consti-
tutional role to avoid tough questions about how business organiza-
tions should be treated for diversity purposes. Corporations have
been granted a special diversity status without a sound analytical
basis for distinguishing among the various business organizations.
Modern commercial realities, however, justify a rule that continues
to treat corporations uniquely. There are meaningful theoretical and
practical differences between corporations and other organizational
forms. Corporations stand alone in their fictional entity status, and
investors make a fundamentally different choice when they select
another organizational regime. Thus, creating a doctrinal wall
around corporations for diversity purposes is consistent with what
investors anticipate when they choose their business form.
The lines drawn by the Court should be solidified. Such solidifica-
tion requires attention to the other two relevant rules: the real party
in controversy approach and Rule 23.2's representative litigant
mechanism. These rules should be aligned with the entity approach
213. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2.
214. See Management Television Sys., Inc. v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D.
162, 164 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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that gives special treatment to corporations, by declaring the real
party approach to be inapplicable in a business organization context,
and by narrowing Rule 23.2's role as a procedural convenience.

